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Abstract—This work proposes a detection scheme that iden-
tifies non-conforming behavior in a VoIP network, based on
statistical analysis and hypothesis testing. VoIP networks are
a popular, low-cost alternative for telephony that offer lower
rates especially for long-distance calls. Other services such as
FollowMe, enhance the traditional voice-oriented nature of these
networks. Consequently several security concerns such as fraud
calls, are related to the high availability required by a VoIP
system. Fraud calls account for an average loss of 3% to 5% of
the operators’ revenue. Thus the detection and prevention of the
users from behaving in a non-conforming way, becomes crucial.
A trustworthy and secure management and billing scheme is
necessary, to guarantee the proper operation. This work proposes
a behavioral control scheme for the VoIP clients. An initial
training period defines the normal behavior. Then statistical
analysis and t-testing is employed to extract results regarding
the users’ profiles, with pre-defined confidence levels. A Buffer
zone creates a more flexible decision-making process. The scheme
also offers the ability to configure its parameters, in order to
react appropriately under different network conditions and detect
possible misuses. It is implemented and its rational operation is
verified via several simulation scenarios.
Keywords—VoIP fraud detection; Intrusion Detection System;
T-testing; non-conforming behaviour; security
I. INTRODUCTION
The convergence of data and voice has been a fact for
the telecommunication systems of the recent years. VoIP-
based networks have gained widespread acceptance among the
telecommunication systems. They offer a variety of services
besides the simple voice calls, based mainly on the IP protocol.
The most dominant protocol used nowadays is the Session Ini-
tiation Protocol (SIP). Platforms such as Asterisk are utilized
to implement fully deployed VoIP-based solutions. However,
this expansion of the VoIP systems has raised several security
issues.
Service fraud is such an issue that costs an average per-
centage loss of 3%-5% of the operators’ revenue [1]. This
fraudulent behavior is realized through a series of attacks
such as billing/dialplan configuration mistakes, usage of stolen
credit card numbers, brute-force attacks to the Call Centers
and hacking of the telephone or soft-phone devices. All these
attacks usually results to (and can be identified by) alterations
in the user’s behavior. Hence misbehaving users must be
detected and excluded from the provision of services in an
effective and accurate way. This must be achieved in a non-
disrupting manner for the rest of the system. It becomes
obvious that the accuracy in the detection procedure and the
small rate of false alarms are crucial facts for the smooth
operation of the VoIP-based networks.
This work is based on a proposed detection scheme for
wireless networks, that uses statistical analysis to extract deci-
sions on the behaviour of certain nodes of the network [2]. The
aforementioned detection scheme is enhanced appropriately to
be adapted to VoIP service providers or systems, that operates
based on contracts that predefine the behaviour and the rights
of each user. The benefits of this work are twofold. First
Intrusion Detection is utilized to introduce a scheme based
on the Anomalous Behavior detection. In order to accurately
define such a model, the Normal behavior of the system must
be defined first, as precise as possible. This is done during
the Training phase, where the system learns which behaviour
is considered as normal for each user. Then the Detection
scheme uses the extracted average values and applies them
to the statistical analysis model, in order to calculate the
deviation from this behavior and evaluate it, so that it can
conclude whether this deviation is statistically significant and
thus possibly caused by a fraudulent usage.
The second benefit of this work is that the system is im-
plemented and tested, based on simulated Call Detail Records
extracted from a fictitious VoIP operator, that represent certain
normal, suspicious or malicious usage scenarios. Ideally these
models should be produced, based on well-known distributions
that represent all the main characteristics of a VoIP network
such as Call Interarrival Times and Call Durations [3].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 presents a wide range of previous work related to VoIP
fraud detection and examines how it relates to ours. Section
3 describes the algorithm used for the detection, based on the
pre-existing work and how this has been enhanced. Section
4 presents the implementation details and its operation. In
Section 5 the simulation part of this work is presented, where
the implemented IDS scheme is tested using several fraudulent
and normal VoIP-based scenarios. Finally, Section 6 concludes
this paper by stating the main results and briefly mention the
basic future directions.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
Fraud Detection in Telecommunication Networks has gone
a long way since the first research efforts to identify and
systematically categorize the different types of frauds as well
as the possible methods to recognize them. In the middle 90s,
the authors in [4] propose a generic framework with some
guidelines on how to categorize fraud activities and identify
the most typical indicators of such behaviors. They suggest
the anonymity of the data mining based on the Toll Tickets.
Two main types of fraud detection are mentioned, namely
the Absolute and the Differential Analysis. They discuss the
advantages of Differential analysis such as flexibility and
agility and how a User Profile is important for this procedure.
Next they talk about the Rule-based approach and how fraud
criteria are defined as rules. Finally they discuss the Neural
network based approach which increases the intelligent of the
detection system, something that is required for the highly het-
erogeneous fraud scenarios. The supervised and unsupervised
learning methods are analyzed and the authors conclude that
since none appears significantly superior to the other, both are
investigated.
Attacks in VoIP Systems extend to a wide range. The
authors in [1] mention both the vulnerabilities that are not
specific to VoIP systems, such as denial of service, which can
be handled by existing network security mechanisms, as well
as threats related specifically to the nature of VoIP systems
such as toll fraud, privacy and degradation of the quality
of service, which can lead to a type of denial of service
attack. The main reason is the clear text transmission of the
packets from the VoIP protocols such as the H.323, the SIP
and the RTP. They propose an IDS called SCIDIVE, with
Cross-protocol detection, that involves packets from multiple
protocols. Based on categorization of packets from different
protocols, they create events, which when combined they lead
to the formation of a more detailed rule that produces alarms
with higher accuracy.
The authors in [5] describe several VoIP related threats
that targets at either SIP or RTP protocols. They suggest that
in order to more efficiently prevent these threats, the cross-
protocol interactions needs to be examined, since VoIP com-
prises a plethora of protocols. Hence they propose a scheme
that performs VoIP intrusion detection by utilizing the state
machines of the protocols and the interactions among them to
track deviations from interacting protocol state machines and
provide intrusion detection with low runtime impact on the
perceived quality.
In [6] a very informative analysis of VoIP fraud is pre-
sented. Firstly VoIP fraud is defined as the effort to avoid
payment either by incorrect payment, or the lack of payment or
the attempt to charge somebody else. The victims can be either
the service providers or bigger enterprises such as AT&T. In
particular, it is mentioned that in 2012, 46% of fraudulent calls
were VoIP based. Then, the authors present a list with the most
popular countries for originating and terminating fraud calls.
The cost of a single VoIP fraud event ranges between 3K and
50K$ and the annual global losses between 30 and 50 billion
$. These numbers definitely troubles the enterprises and the
providers, since the losses range between 3 and 10 percent
of their income. Finally it is worth mentioning that this type
of fraud increases with a rate of 29% per year. The authors
suggest that the best and simplest way to mitigate the results
of these frauds is to analyze the Call Detail Record, in near
real time and extract alerts or actions such as block a call. It
is important to monitor the system during weekends, holidays
and overnight where many of the VoIP frauds take place. Thus
TransNexus implements a scheme that provides fraud detection
by analyzing CDRs and observing possible, unusual traffic
spikes that may lead to alarms or blocking actions.
The authors in [7] follow a different approach in securing
VoIP systems, by proposing the use of Honeypots for intrusion
detection in VoIP infrastructures. Actually they design a hon-
eypot cloud, using several well-known honeypots in order to
obtain valuable, realistic data from hacker VoIP attacks in the
network and analyze them. They evaluate the performance of
each honeypot and collect data such as malicious IP addresses.
In the future such a honeypot data analysis can cooperate with
an IPS for immediate reaction to security threats.
In [8], the authors propose a multilayer intrusion detection
and prevention system for VoIP infrastructures. Specifically
their work is based on the joint operation of a VoIP-specific
honeypot and an application layer, event correlation engine.
Any activity seen on the VoIP-specific honeypot is considered
as a malicious one and the initiator as an attacker, since
normally this system should not experience any traffic. At the
same time, the event correlation engine is able to collect events
from different sources in order to better realize the distributed
nature of a VoIP system. These events are next fed as inputs to
the event correlator, which acts as an anomaly based intrusion
detection system. The goal is to achieve a holistic solution
that can detect multiple types of attacks. Similarly to our
work, the authors briefly mention the concept of anomaly-
based intrusion detection with several specific metrics such
as number of different recipients and number of calls, but no
further analysis or implementation details are provided.
The authors in [9] propose a network-based intrusion
detection mechanism, which uses a statistical Bayes model to
detect intrusive SIP traffic. After examining the major VoIP-
related threats, they present the weaknesses of some solutions
such as the TLS and the S/MIME which heavily impact the
performance. They proceed by modeling the SIP traffic in order
to produce the Conditional Probability Tables, required by a
Bayes model to detect several VoIP related threats such as
SPIT, enumeration and DoS.
Hilas and Sahalos [10] presented a similar approach in
several ways. Their main concentration is to construct certain
profiles using PBX-based calls, that are used to determine
whether a user is suspicious of becoming fraudulent. These
profiles are based on eight features, that construct the user
profile, such as the amount and the duration of Local calls,
placed on a Telecommunication center of a Greek University.
They extract the average values of these metrics and compare
them with those of a later instant, trying to measure the
similarity. The tool that they use for this purpose is the
ANOVA test that performs k pair-by-pair t-tests. The main
differentiation of the present study is the introduction of the
constant retraining and the Buffer zone, that brings a certain
level of flexibility in the decision making. Hilas and Sahalos
used the similar concept of equality interval, however the idea
of monitoring based on a fuzzy decision is still missing.
Finally in [11] Rehabi et al. provide some interesting data
on the state of VoIP fraud and its impact on the corresponding
market. Specifically they claim that VoIP fraud accounts for a
3-5% losses of the annual revenue of operators and it is still
increasing at a rate of more than 10% per year. Then they
proceed by presenting the most known anti-fraud techniques
which are divided into three main categories; the Rule-based
techniques, the Supervised and the Unsupervised methods. The
first category operates by using rules, which contain several
conditions such as whether or not a suspicious transaction
matches a blacklist. These rules can be combined with statis-
tics. The second category refers to data mining and includes
techniques such as neural networks, fuzzy logic and Bayesian
networks. Then fraud patterns for both normal and fraudulent
behaviors are constructed. The third category refers to the
Unsupervised methods, where no prior knowledge about the
observation classes in the dataset is required. In this case we
do not know which transactions are legitimate and which are
fraudulent. Hence profiles are created based on the cumulated
past activity. The concept is that these profiles are used to
predict the future behavior and any statistically significant
deviation from that is considered suspicious and may conceal
fraudulent activities. However, deeper investigation is required
for these suspicious alarms. This method requires the mining
of a huge number of CDRs. Our proposed Detection System
(which will be described in the next section), belongs in the
category of Unsupervised methods. The authors conclude their
work by describing how the Scamstop projects tries to respond
to the challenges of VoIP fraud by designing a Detection
Framework.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE DETECTION ALGORITHM
The proposed scheme for detecting fraudulent activity in
VoIP networks can utilize features such as call duration or call
inter-arrival time, that virtually describe a VoIP network in the
call level. The analysis that follows is based on a statistical
framework for abnormal behavior detection, proposed in [2].
That work was initially designed for wireless networks. It
is altered to operate appropriately in a VoIP network with a
multitude of heterogeneous users. Additionally, series of VoIP
calls initiated by a specific user may be categorised as normal,
malicious and suspicious, providing further flexibility in the
detection phase.
Briefly, the proposed scheme performs Hypothesis testing,
by using the t-testing method, in order to detect user be-
haviors that statistically deviates from what has been defined
as normal, with a predefined significance level. The scheme
can be deployed inside a VoIP system and examine the
traffic produced by different users. Subsequently it attempts
to determine if there is a significant possibility of fraudulent
behavior. In such a case it posts an alert.
To successfully perform the detection, the False Negative
(Type I) and the False Positive (Type II) errors need to be
minimized. Therefore the scheme initially models the normal
behavior of the system and quantifies it by extracting statistical
properties, such as the mean and the standard deviation. This is
called the Initial Training Phase of the algorithm. The accuracy
and the overall performance of the fraud detection system also
depends on the duration of the Initial Training Phase. The
actual detection phase follows, by trying to compare recent
traffic data with that of the training phase. If no malicious
activity is detected, then the system performs a lightweight
re-training to smoothly adapt to the dynamically changing
behavior of the VoIP users. If a suspicious or malicious activity
is detected, the re-training is suspended, until a final decision
is made for this user.
After the detection phase, a user’s behavior can be catego-
rized as:
• Normal, where no threatening activity is detected.
• Malicious, where the behaviour significantly exceeds
the user’s normal activities and thus the system im-
mediately characterize this user.
• Suspicious, where the current activity appears to de-
viates from its normal behavior. However, it is not
obvious whether this is a possible malicious activity or
simply a random event of increased traffic. In this case,
the system considers this behaviour as suspicious, no
decisions are made, the lightweight training process
is suspended for that user (in order not to train the
scheme in a possibly malicious behavior) and the sys-
tem continues observing its activities to determine the
actual status at a later stage, with higher probability
of success. The user is considered to have entered
the Buffer zone. If a user remains in the Buffer zone
for a configurable number of consecutive time-periods,
then the system identifies the behavior as malicious.
Otherwise, the user exits the Buffer zone.
Decisions about the status of a user (malicious, normal
or suspicious) are made throughout the time period of the
operation. Note that the Buffer zone provides the scheme with
some adaptability to possible behavioral changes. It can be
appropriately configured, to adapt to the dynamic nature of
a VoIP user and to absorb temporary bursts of its behavior.
This is achieved by defining the values α and γ. The overall
description of the system is shown in Figure 1:
The parameters that mainly quantify the VoIP user’s be-
havior in the call level, are the following:
• Call Duration, for each registered user of the VoIP
network.
• Interarrival times of outgoing calls, which describes
the frequency that a registered user initiates calls.
• Interarrival times towards a specific geographic loca-
tion, which describes the frequency of calls to a certain
city.
By performing the Detection algorithm to these parame-
ters, a wide range of attacks related to fraud calls, DoS to
certain users/destinations or usage of stolen accounts can be
eliminated. Currently the proposed scheme implements the
Interarrival times of outgoing calls, by measuring the call rate
of each user.
Fig. 1. Architecture of Detection Scheme
A. Initial Training Phase
The first part of the proposed scheme is the initial training
phase. It is executed only once for each user and lasts for a
pre-defined time period, called ttr. During this time, behavioral
features are extracted from the VoIP traffic, to construct
the statistical model that describes the normal behavior. In
particular this period is divided into a series of m sub-periods.
The measured parameter is then calculated for each subperiod.
The current version of the proposed scheme measures the
number of calls, initiated by a specific user. This is denoted by
x0(i), where 0 stands for the initial training period and i stands
for the number of the sampling sub-period. Subsequently, the
mean number of calls for the initial period is calculated and
denoted by µ0.
Similarly the standard deviation of the number of calls, is
calculated by:
σ0 =
√√√√ 1
m− 1
m∑
i=1
(x0(i)− µ0)2 (1)
The total duration of the initial training period and the
number of sampling sub-periods define the accuracy of the
proposed scheme and can be decided by the network admin-
istrator, based on the characteristics of the VoIP system. The
assumption made, is that the user’s initial behavior is normal.
An extended initial training period can lead to a more precise
model, however this introduces the risk of accepting some
fraud behaviors as normal. The number m of the sub-periods
also affects the sensitivity of the model.
The initial normal behavior of each user is defined by the
calculated mean and standard deviation. However, the scheme
is retrained for each user throughout its lifetime, in parallel
with the Detection Period. In that way, the algorithm can be re-
trained to slightly changing behaviors of the user and increase
the accuracy of the detection. This also makes the scheme
more adaptable to the dynamic nature of the VoIP user over
time.
B. Detection Phase
Next, the detection phase evaluates the statistical difference
between the initial (normal) and the current behavior. It initi-
ates after the initial training phase and continues throughout
the system’s operation, in parallel with the Re-training phase.
It is partitioned in detection periods, each lasting tdet time.
After each period is completed a decision is made, regarding
the behavior of the active users during this time span. The
algorithm continues to sample the number of successful calls.
This number is denoted as xd(i), where d1 is the number of
the detection period and i is the number of the sampling sub-
period as stated above. For simplicity reasons it is assumed that
tdet = ttr and the number of sampling sub-periods m remains
the same. For each detection period the mean is denoted by
µd.
The evaluation of the behavior alterations is based on the
Hypothesis testing. The Null Hypothesis is defined as ”The
current usage is not fraudulent”. This hypothesis is not rejected
as long as the metrics of the current usage are statistically
similar to those of the trained normal usage. The hypothesis
is rejected if the metrics of two consecutive periods are
found significantly different from each other. The significance
level is decided by the significance parameter α. Thus, the
scheme quantifies the False Positive (the error of rejecting the
Null Hypothesis, while actually being true). Parameter γ is
introduced to define the lower end of the Buffer Zone, which
was earlier described. The selection of these parameters affect
the Type I and Type II errors. The final decision is a tradeoff
between retaining the credibility to the users and reducing the
cost of these type of attacks.
The t-testing method is chosen to evaluate the Hypothesis:
td =
µd − µ0
σ0
√
m− 1 (2)
The proposed scheme applies the one-sample t-test to test
the null hypothesis, since the normal behavior of a user is
considered as the accepted value and its subsequent behavior
is compared with that. Also, given that in the current imple-
mentation, lower mean values than the accepted ones are not
of interest (since they express lower amount of traffic), the
one-tail t-test is chosen.
Consequently, it is evaluated whether the difference be-
tween the current mean and the non-fraudulent mean of the
training data is statistically significant. As shown in Figure 2,
if a user is found in Zone 1, the Hypothesis is assumed to
be true and the user is considered as Normal. Respectively, if
found in Zone 3 this means that the difference is significant and
the hypothesis must be rejected, hence the user is considered
as possibly malicious. The confidence level of this decision
equals to (1 − α). The algorithm then generates an Alert. In
case the behavior falls within Zone 2, then the user enters the
Buffer Zone and is further monitored. The p-value that follows
the t-test, is utilized to identify in which Zone the statistical
difference falls into.
Fig. 2. The three Zones for evaluating the results of the one-tail t-test
C. Re-training Phase
As it was stated in the previous paragraph, the training
continues throughout the lifetime of each user. In case the
Detection phase concludes that the user’s behaviour is normal,
then the measurements of the current period should be incor-
porated in its behavior metrics. Subsequently the system needs
to be re-trained based on this updated normal behaviour.
The proposed scheme employs the concept of the Expo-
nential Moving Average, to implement the re-training of the
system. Specifically, if the system is examining the nth period
of the user, then the updated expected behaviour uµin of user
i is calculated by:
uµin = (µn) ∗
1
n
+ (µn−1) ∗ n− 1
n
(3)
Alternatively, if the user was indicated as suspicious before,
and has already entered the Buffered Zone for one or more
periods, the retraining of the system for this user has been
suspended. If the user exits the Buffered zone in this current
period, the system is required to be re-trained using not only
the data of this current period but also of all the previous
buffered ones. In general, the updated expected behaviour in
case of exiting the buffer zone is calculated by:
uµin = (µn) ∗
1
n
+ (µn−1) ∗ 2
n
+ ..+ (µn−k) ∗ n− k
n
(4)
where k is the number of possible buffering periods. The
proposed scheme considers any user that remains buffered for
more than 2 times as malicious, hence k ≤ 3.
This type of re-training is as leightweight as required by a
system that scales up to several thousands users, but also tries
to appropriately capture the continually changing behaviour
of the multitude of VoIP users, by avoiding a more static
calculation.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION
RESULTS
A. Implementation
The scheme is implemented as a proof of concept, in
order to verify the rational operation of the proposed intrusion
detection, under a multitude of different scenarios with simu-
lated VoIP traffic. The implementation was realized using the
Python programming language [12]. The pre-existing method
ttest 1samp is employed, as it implements a two-sided t-test,
using one sample of values that are statistically compared to
the pre-calculated mean values that define the normal behavior.
The evaluated metric in the current version is the call rate,
initiated by each user of the network. Part of the future work
is to further develop other metrics, such as the duration time
of the calls, in order to enhance the detection abilities of the
scheme.
As stated before, the users are going through an initial
training phase and subsequently the system is continuously
retrained, to make the detection more precise in cases of minor
alterations in the user’s behavior.
Without loss of generality, if a user remains in the Buffer
zone for three consecutive detection periods, it is considered
as malicious. This number can be altered, depending on the
period duration and the VoIP network’s characteristics.
Finally, in case the system detects a user that continuously
increases its call rate for more than five consecutive periods,
it posts an alarm. Then the administrator/security engineer
decides on the possible threat. Similarly, this number can be
altered based on the network requirements and the level of
sensitivity.
B. Results Analysis
Certain scenarios are designed, based on simulated CDRs,
in order to verify the correct operation of the system. These
scenarios simulate several normal and fraudulent cases, as
well as some extreme cases in terms of user behavior. One
such scenario simulates the case where the intrusion detection
scheme smoothly adapts to a continuously changing behavior
of a user, by going through the re-training phase. The examined
scenarios are explained in more details, as follows:
1) Scenario 1 - Normal user, with a continuously chang-
ing behavior, which however does not significantly
differentiates from its normal behavior.
2) Scenario 2 - Buffered user that becomes normal
again, where certain random traffic spikes lead the
system to characterize the user as suspicious and
to observe it more carefully for some time period
in the Buffer zone. At some later time and before
being characterized as malicious, the user returns to
its normal status and exits the Buffer zone.
3) Scenario 3- Buffered user that becomes malicious,
where certain traffic spikes lead the system to char-
acterize the user as suspicious (Buffer zone). After
some observation time where its behavior continues
to differ from the normal one, the system decides that
the user is probably malicious.
4) Scenario 4 - Malicious user, where the user is de-
tected directly as malicious, due to a significantly
different behavior from its normal.
5) Scenario 5 - Normal user with changing behavior,
where the user gradually but quite smoothly change
its behavior and increases the call rate. The system is
trained to this new behavior, without considering the
user as suspicious or malicious, due to the intensity
of this change. However, the system issue alert signs
when the user increases its call rate for several times
in a row.
In general, the proposed scheme performed as expected
in all five scenarios. Hence, a wide range of possible user
behaviors are proven to be correctly identified by the proposed
system. The results also showed that the accurate response
of the scheme mainly depends on the configuration of the
border parameters of the Buffer Zone. The α and γ values
define the width of the Buffer Zone and consequently the
possibility of detecting a user as Suspicious, Malicious or
simply Normal. The presented scenarios produce different
results when these limits are altered. For example, in one case
a user is initially identified in the Buffer zone, and when the
α and γ values are changed accordingly, then the same user
is directly characterized as malicious.
In Scenario 2, an initially normal user is buffered for one
time period, perhaps due to a random spike in its call rate. In
the next period, the user returns to its normal behavior and
the detection scheme unbuffers it and performs the retraining
including the data of the previous period. Figure 3 shows the
Current Mean of the user’s call rate, as measured at the end of
the detection period, compared to the Total Mean, measured
up to the beginning of this current period. The p-value of the
t-test performed for these two means in also presented, for this
particular scenario.
Fig. 3. A buffered user that is later unbuffered and becomes normal again.
Figure 4 presents Scenario 3, where a user, initially identi-
fied as normal, later enters the Buffer zone. The threshold for
assuming that a previously buffered user is probably malicious,
is set to three times. So the third consecutive time that a user
is found in the Buffer zone, it is identified as malicious.
Fig. 4. A buffered user that is later identified as malicious.
Finally, Figure 5 shows Scenario 5, which refers to the case
where a user gradually but steadily alters its initial behavior. In
particular the user starts with an average of ten calls per period
and concludes with twenty-eight calls per period. Despite the
increase of 280%, the user is not detected as Malicious or
even buffered during the scenario lifetime. This is due to
its smooth and gradual change of the behavior, without any
sudden increases or spikes in the produced traffic. Hence, the
scheme proves to be able to learn the behavior of such a user
and adapt. The downside of this feature, is that an educated
attacker that can control its attack in an efficient way, can trick
this scheme into accepting its behavior as normal.
Fig. 5. The increase of the Call Rate is continuous but smooth enough, so
that no malicious behavior is detected with the t-test and the p-value.
C. Sensitivity Analysis
As shown before, the one-tail t-test evaluates whether the
Null Hypothesis should be rejected, by utilizing the Buffer
zone. The Buffer zone is implemented by an upper and a lower
level, which are defined by the values 1 − α and 1 − γ, as
depicted in Figure 2. The sensitivity of the detection scheme
mainly depends on these two parameters. By altering their
values, the results may differ, even in the case of the same
user executing the exact same scenario.
In particular, the value for the upper level 1−α, defines the
difficulty of detecting a user directly as malicious. The value
of the lower level 1−γ, defines how easily a user is detected as
normal. Lastly, the combination of these two values, defines
the range of the Buffer zone and consequently the decision
of characterizing a node as suspicious, which imposes to the
system the overhead of continuously monitoring this user. If
the the α and γ values are close, then the range is short and the
probability of a user falling in the Buffer zone is small. This
approach increases the decision speed of the scheme, however
it can reduce its accuracy, since the decision is mainly based
on unique events rather than on a longer monitoring. If the
aforementioned values differ significantly, then a wide Buffer
zone is created and the decision making procedure lasts longer
but can be more accurate.
For example, Scenario 3 initially identifies the user as
Buffered and then as Malicious. The α and γ parameters are
set to 0.05 and 0.4 respectively. Next, the γ value is changed to
0.2, thus reducing the range of Buffer zone. The same scenario
now considers the user as normal. Figure 6 shows the different
output of the proposed scheme, for this user, during period 14,
under the same scenario. Note that this is virtually equivalent
to altering the significance level of the Hypothesis test.
Fig. 6. The smaller buffer zone’s range on the bottom, after decreasing the
γ value, alters the decision of the proposed detection scheme
Note that in the case where the user is buffered (image on
the top), no re-training is applied. Hence the Total Average
remains unchanged, despite the case on the bottom image,
where after the decision process, it is recalculated since the
user is identified as normal.
V. CONCLUSION
This work presents a detection scheme for non-conforming
behaviors in a VoIP network, using statistical analysis and
more precisely hypothesis testing. The proposed design initi-
ates with a training period, based on which the system is able
to define the normal behavior for each user. The operational
period follows, where the scheme calculates and compares
the average values that characterize the user’s behavior. Con-
currently, a re-training period is performed for every normal
user. In that way the security status of the VoIP system is
continuously evaluated.
The scheme is implemented and tested under a variety
of simulation scenarios, to verify the behavior of a VoIP-
based system under specific requirements and conditions. All
these scenarios were successfully completed and the expected
results were obtained during the simulations. It is shown that
the intrusion detection decisions are mainly dependent on the
values assigned to the α and γ parameters and can adapt
to changing behaviors. However, an educated attacker, under
certain conditions, can train the system to identify its malicious
behavior as a normal one.
The future work includes the performance of more real-
istic simulation scenarios, produced based on existing traffic
modelling of VoIP data, in order to verify in a more precise
way the operation of the proposed scheme. Comparison and
evaluation with other detection schemes, in terms of credibility
and performance, is also part of the future plans.
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